The assassination of Ahmad Wali Karzai, the chairman of the Kandahar Provincial Council and President Hamid Karzai's half-brother, is an enormous propaganda and moral boost for the Taliban.
It is as yet unclear who was responsible for Ahmad Wali's assassination. Even if it was carried out, as one report suggests, by a body guard with a personal grudge, it will certainly be exploited by the Taliban for propaganda purposes and will damage fragile public confidence in Karzai's government.
Ahmad Wali was one of the two key government players in the important southern province of Kandahar, which the insurgency would likely have considered as priority targets for assassination. The other is the police chief, Brigadier General Abdul Razik, another powerful Pashtun. Wali was the de facto governor of Kandahar, eclipsing the influence both of the official governor and the provincial council, of which he was chairman.
The provincial council does not wield any real authority. Neither does it have direct control over appointments to, or deployment of, security forces, even in Kandahar City. Ahmed Shah Khan, an influential Pashtun tribal elder could well emerge as Ahmad Karzai's successor on the council (since the deputy chairman was also killed in this attack) in the provincial council, in the form of a consensus candidate.
He is very unlikely to exert the overarching political and economic influence that Ahmad Karzai exerted through his financial clout, and close ties to the US. His assassination is likely to drive home a very stark message to the Afghan population, that the Afghan state under President Karzai is incapable of providing security, even for its own leadership.
As such, this will make it much harder for Nato to persuade the local population to switch their allegiance to the Afghan government as ISAF forces begin to hand over the security lead to Afghan. The immediate commercial impact of his death will be felt by the string of businesses owned by the 'King of Kandahar,' as the staunchly pro-US Ahmad Karzai was known; their future is now unclear.
These include influential private security companies, such as Watan Risk Management and Asia Security Group, which have contracts with ISAF for protecting its supply convoys. The latter also runs its own a private paramilitary unit in the province – the Kandahar Strike Force that assisted US Special Forces and the CIA to seek out and kill senior Taliban insurgents. Ahmad also owned or ran a string of hotels, real estate companies and even a Toyota car dealership.
He will also be remembered for the extensive narcotics empire that he ran from Kandahar, under the aegis of the provincial government. The smuggling operations he set up are unlikely to fracture in his absence. The Taliban are also quite likely to exploit the 'sense of shock' in Kandahar City by launching another major attack in the coming days.
Ahmad Karzai's funeral is a likely target, especially as this will be attended by prominent government and security force figures, and will be another test of the effectiveness of Afghan and ISAF security measures.
It is as yet unclear who was responsible for Ahmad Wali's assassination. Even if it was carried out, as one report suggests, by a body guard with a personal grudge, it will certainly be exploited by the Taliban for propaganda purposes and will damage fragile public confidence in Karzai's government.
Ahmad Wali was one of the two key government players in the important southern province of Kandahar, which the insurgency would likely have considered as priority targets for assassination. The other is the police chief, Brigadier General Abdul Razik, another powerful Pashtun. Wali was the de facto governor of Kandahar, eclipsing the influence both of the official governor and the provincial council, of which he was chairman.
The provincial council does not wield any real authority. Neither does it have direct control over appointments to, or deployment of, security forces, even in Kandahar City. Ahmed Shah Khan, an influential Pashtun tribal elder could well emerge as Ahmad Karzai's successor on the council (since the deputy chairman was also killed in this attack) in the provincial council, in the form of a consensus candidate.
He is very unlikely to exert the overarching political and economic influence that Ahmad Karzai exerted through his financial clout, and close ties to the US. His assassination is likely to drive home a very stark message to the Afghan population, that the Afghan state under President Karzai is incapable of providing security, even for its own leadership.
As such, this will make it much harder for Nato to persuade the local population to switch their allegiance to the Afghan government as ISAF forces begin to hand over the security lead to Afghan. The immediate commercial impact of his death will be felt by the string of businesses owned by the 'King of Kandahar,' as the staunchly pro-US Ahmad Karzai was known; their future is now unclear.
These include influential private security companies, such as Watan Risk Management and Asia Security Group, which have contracts with ISAF for protecting its supply convoys. The latter also runs its own a private paramilitary unit in the province – the Kandahar Strike Force that assisted US Special Forces and the CIA to seek out and kill senior Taliban insurgents. Ahmad also owned or ran a string of hotels, real estate companies and even a Toyota car dealership.
He will also be remembered for the extensive narcotics empire that he ran from Kandahar, under the aegis of the provincial government. The smuggling operations he set up are unlikely to fracture in his absence. The Taliban are also quite likely to exploit the 'sense of shock' in Kandahar City by launching another major attack in the coming days.
Ahmad Karzai's funeral is a likely target, especially as this will be attended by prominent government and security force figures, and will be another test of the effectiveness of Afghan and ISAF security measures.
